Daf 10a: Acquiring for Another, a Worker’s Hand, and Four Cubits

Here is the complete Gemara text of this daf, word for word, divided into the stages of the sugya: Mishnah, question, kushya, terutz, raya and conclusion. Read each stage in the source first, then the explanation.

1. 01·KushyaBava Metzia 10a

   מַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי – רַבָּנַן הִיא. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ בְּעָשִׁיר וְעָנִי מַחְלוֹקֶת, אֲבָל מֵעָנִי לְעָנִי דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל זָכָה לוֹ, הָא מַנִּי? לָא רַבָּנַן וְלָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר!

   The page opens within an investigation begun on the preceding page: does the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages about pe’ah include a poor person gathering for another poor person? If the Sages reject acquisition for another even there, the Mishnah about a rider asking someone to lift a find can follow their view. But if everyone agrees that one poor person acquires for another, our Mishnah seems to fit neither opinion. With a find, the lifter can also acquire personally, making him comparable to a poor person entitled to gather pe’ah. The objection assumes that the Mishnah lets the lifter keep the object even after lifting it for the rider, implying that the lifting did not acquire it for the rider.

2. 02·TerutzBava Metzia 10a

   אֲמַר לֵיהּ, מַתְנִיתִין דְּאָמַר תְּחִילָּה.

   The answer reads the Mishnah as a case in which the lifter says that he acquired the find for himself “initially.” His claim is that he acted for himself at the moment of lifting. This is not an unsuccessful attempt to acquire for the rider, but an act originally directed toward the lifter himself. Acquisition genuinely performed for another can therefore remain effective, while the lifter in this Mishnah acquires personally. The answer changes the interpretation of the case, not the principle of acquiring for another.

3. 03·RayaBava Metzia 10a

   הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אִם מִשֶּׁנְּתָנָהּ לוֹ אָמַר אֲנִי זָכִיתִי בָּהּ תְּחִילָּה – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. תְּחִילָּה בְּסֵיפָא לְמָה לִי? פְּשִׁיטָא, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא אָמַר תְּחִילָּה, תְּחִילָּה קָאָמַר. אֶלָּא לָאו הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, רֵישָׁא דְּאָמַר ״תְּחִילָּה״.

   The Gemara supports this reading from the latter clause, where the lifter claims after delivery: “I acquired it initially.” Once he has handed the object to the rider, his ownership claim clearly concerns a time before delivery. The word “initially” therefore appears unnecessary for that clause itself. The Gemara proposes that it also teaches us how to read the first clause: there too, he claims to have lifted for himself from the outset. A linguistic detail thus becomes a supporting beam for the preceding answer.

4. 04·TerutzBava Metzia 10a

   וְאִידַּךְ: תְּנָא סֵיפָא לְגַלּוֹיֵי רֵישָׁא. סֵיפָא, דְּאָמַר תְּחִילָּה. רֵישָׁא, דְּלָא אָמַר תְּחִילָּה.

   The opposing side explains that the same word distinguishes the Mishnah’s two clauses. The latter clause says “initially,” whereas the first contains no such claim. On this reading, the lifter in the first clause can acquire personally without claiming that he originally lifted for himself. It therefore remains possible to infer that lifting for the rider did not acquire the object for him. This answer defeats the proposed linguistic proof: the latter clause can illuminate the first through contrast rather than similarity.

5. 05·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 10a

   רַב נַחְמָן וְרַב חִסְדָּא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ – לֹא קָנָה חֲבֵירוֹ. מַאי טַעְמָא – הָוֵי תּוֹפֵס לְבַעַל חוֹב בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁחָב לַאֲחֵרִים, וְהַתּוֹפֵס לְבַעַל חוֹב בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁחָב לַאֲחֵרִים – לֹא קָנָה.

   Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda state that lifting a find for another does not acquire it for that person. Their reasoning compares this to seizing assets for a creditor when the seizure disadvantages others. Such seizure favors one creditor at the expense of other creditors, so under the rule cited here it is ineffective for the intended beneficiary. With a find, lifting for one person prevents everyone else from acquiring the object. The analogy does not turn a find into a debt; it identifies a shared structure of benefiting another while harming others’ opportunities.

6. 06·KushyaBava Metzia 10a

   אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: מְצִיאַת פּוֹעֵל לְעַצְמוֹ. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – בִּזְמַן שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת ״נַכֵּשׁ עִמִּי הַיּוֹם״, ״עֲדוֹר עִמִּי הַיּוֹם״. אֲבָל אָמַר לוֹ ״עֲשֵׂה עִמִּי מְלָאכָה הַיּוֹם״ – מְצִיאָתוֹ שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת הוּא!

   Rava challenges Rav Naḥman from a source concerning a worker’s find. If hired to weed or hoe, the worker keeps the find, because the commitment concerns a particular task rather than gathering finds. But if hired in general terms, “Work for me today,” the source assigns the find to the employer. In the second case, one person apparently lifts a find and another acquires it. It is therefore insufficient simply to say that lifting for another disadvantages other potential finders; the effectiveness of this case needs explanation.

7. 07·TerutzBava Metzia 10a

   אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שָׁאנֵי פּוֹעֵל, דְּיָדוֹ כְּיַד בַּעַל הַבַּיִת הוּא.

   Rav Naḥman answers that a worker is different because his hand counts as the employer’s hand. Within the general employment arrangement discussed here, the worker’s action is attributed to the employer himself. This is therefore not the ordinary case of an independent person seizing for another. The answer does not deny that the employer acquires; it explains why that acquisition does not contradict the earlier rule. The scope of the work commitment supports the distinction between the source’s two types of workers.

8. 08·KushyaBava Metzia 10a

   וְהָאָמַר רַב: פּוֹעֵל יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ אֲפִילּוּ בַּחֲצִי הַיּוֹם!

   The Gemara objects from Rav’s statement that a worker may withdraw even halfway through the day. That right shows that the worker is not under the employer’s absolute control. The objection assumes that such freedom conflicts with describing the worker’s hand as the employer’s hand. It therefore targets the explanation of the find’s ownership, rather than that ownership directly. Resolving it requires distinguishing the status of an action during employment from the ability to end the employment.

9. 09·TerutzBava Metzia 10a

   אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כֹּל כַּמָּה דְּלָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ, כְּיַד בַּעַל הַבַּיִת הוּא. כִּי הֲדַר בֵּיהּ, טַעְמָא אַחֲרִינָא הוּא, דִּכְתִיב: ״כִּי לִי בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל עֲבָדִים, עֲבָדַי הֵם״ – וְלֹא עֲבָדִים לַעֲבָדִים.

   The answer separates two levels: until the worker withdraws, his hand counts as the employer’s hand within his work. The right to withdraw rests on a different ground, the verse “For the children of Israel are servants to Me.” The exposition “and not servants to servants” protects his freedom and prevents employment from becoming bondage he cannot leave. The right of exit does not cancel attribution of his actions to the employer while the work continues. This distinction connects to Bava Metzia’s employment sugyot: a work agreement’s force is not ownership of a person.

10. 10·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 10a

    אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ – קָנָה חֲבֵירוֹ. וְאִם תֹּאמַר מִשְׁנָתֵינוּ, דְּאָמַר ״תְּנָהּ לִי״, וְלָא אָמַר ״זְכָהּ לִי״.

    Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba reports Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opposing position: lifting a find for another does acquire it for that person. He also explains why the rider’s Mishnah does not contradict this. The rider said “Give it to me,” not “Acquire it for me,” so his request concerns delivery rather than acquisition at the moment of lifting. Failure to acquire in this case therefore does not show that lifting with the intention of acquiring for another is ineffective. This is another resolution of the Mishnah, based on the rider’s wording rather than the lifter’s claim “initially.”

11. 11·Mishnah / BaraitaBava Metzia 10a

    מַתְנִי׳ רָאָה אֶת הַמְּצִיאָה וְנָפַל עָלֶיהָ, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהֶחְזִיק בָּהּ – זֶה שֶׁהֶחְזִיק בָּהּ זָכָה בָּהּ.

    The new Mishnah describes someone who sees a find and falls on it. Another person comes and takes hold of it, and the Mishnah awards acquisition to the second person. Falling on the object is not sufficient here as an act of acquisition. The Mishnah thus continues the chapter’s distinction between wanting to secure a find and performing an act that acquires it. A further question will arise: even if falling does not acquire, perhaps proximity acquires the object through four cubits.

12. 12·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 10a

    גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מִשּׁוּם אַבָּא כֹּהֵן בַּרְדְּלָא: אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁל אָדָם קוֹנוֹת לוֹ בְּכׇל מָקוֹם. [מַאי טַעְמָא] תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן, דְּלָא (אָתֵי) [לֵיתוֹ] לְאִנְּצוֹיֵי. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מוֹתֵיב רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר יוֹסֵף פֵּיאָה. אָמַר רָבָא: מוֹתֵיב רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִי נְזִיקִין.

    Reish Lakish reports in the name of Abba Kohen Bardela that a person’s four cubits acquire for him “everywhere.” The Gemara explains that this is a rabbinic enactment intended to prevent quarrels over finds. Rather than making everything depend on a physical struggle over the object, the enactment gives acquisitive significance to the area around a person. Its wording is broad at this stage, but we should not assume in advance that it has no limitations. Abaye and Rava identify two source-based objections, one from Pe’ah and one from Nezikin, meaning our Mishnah in that order; the pe’ah objection is examined first.

13. 13·KushyaBava Metzia 10a

    אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, מוֹתֵיב רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר יוֹסֵף פֵּיאָה: נָטַל מִקְצָת פֵּיאָה וְזָרַק עַל הַשְּׁאָר – אֵין לוֹ בָּהּ כְּלוּם. נָפַל לוֹ עָלֶיהָ, פֵּרַס טַלִּיתוֹ עָלֶיהָ – מַעֲבִירִין אוֹתוֹ הֵימֶנָּה. וְכֵן בְּעוֹמֶר שִׁכְחָה. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁל אָדָם קוֹנוֹת לוֹ בְּכׇל מָקוֹם, נִקְנוֹ לֵיהּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת דִּידֵיהּ!

    The source from Pe’ah states that throwing already gathered pe’ah onto the remainder does not acquire that remainder for the thrower. Falling on it or spreading a cloak over it likewise does not secure acquisition, and the person is removed from it; a similar rule applies to a forgotten sheaf. The objection does not demand recognition of these actions as valid acts of acquisition. It asks why the person’s four cubits do not acquire whatever lies within them, independently of those actions. If the enactment applies “everywhere,” rejecting falling alone does not explain the failure to acquire.

14. 14·TerutzBava Metzia 10a

    הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – דְּלָא אֲמַר ״אֶקְנֵי״.

    The Gemara proposes that the source concerns someone who did not say, “I shall acquire.” This proposal assumes that an expression of intent to activate four-cubit acquisition is missing. On that account, the pe’ah’s mere presence nearby is insufficient in this case. Both the enactment and the Pe’ah source could apparently remain intact. But this is only an initial answer, and the supposed need for a declaration is immediately tested.

15. 15·KushyaBava Metzia 10a

    וְאִי תַּקּוּן רַבָּנַן, כִּי לָא אֲמַר מַאי הָוֵי?!

    The Gemara asks why the absence of a declaration matters if the Sages have already enacted that four cubits acquire. The objection assumes that the mechanism does not require a special announcement on each occasion. Silence alone therefore does not explain why acquisition failed. This is not yet a claim that intention has no significance whatsoever. The question requires the answer to identify something stronger than the absence of the words “I shall acquire.”

16. 16·TerutzBava Metzia 10a

    כֵּיוָן דִּנְפַל, גַּלִּי דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּבִנְפִילָה נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּנִקְנֵי, בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּנִקְנֵי.

    The answer identifies an affirmative revelation of intention in the act of falling, not mere silence. Through his conduct, the person shows that he wants to acquire by falling rather than through four cubits. According to this answer, that choice prevents reliance on the enactment here, even though falling itself does not acquire. The local objection is thus resolved: the enactment fails to operate not because no declaration was made, but because he revealed a preference not to use it. We should not extend this answer to every mistaken acquisition attempt without further analysis, and the enactment’s limits remain under investigation later in the sugya.

1. 1How does the answer “he said initially” resolve the rider’s Mishnah? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
2. 2What grounds Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda’s comparison to seizing for a creditor? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
3. 3How is a worker’s right to withdraw compatible with “his hand is the employer’s hand”? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
4. 4What role does the distinction between “Give it to me” and “Acquire it for me” play in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s position? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
5. 5What does the final answer add beyond the proposal “he did not say, ‘I shall acquire’”? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.