On Bava Metzia ט ע״א (9a), we examine what turns control of an animal and its reins into an act of acquisition. We build the argument through close reading, analysis of lifting, and the distinction between finding an ownerless object and purchasing an item.
Here is the complete Gemara text of this daf, word for word, divided into the stages of the sugya: Mishnah, question, kushya, terutz, raya and conclusion. Read each stage in the source first, then the explanation.
בְּמִדָּה זֹאת קָנוּ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם לֹא קָנָה עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא מְשִׁיכָה בְּגָמָל וְהַנְהָגָה בַּחֲמוֹר.
The page opens with the continuation of a baraita from the preceding page, not a new Mishnah. The first tanna says that acquisition occurs in the manner described there. Rabbi Yehuda requires pulling for a camel and driving for a donkey. On his view, not every way of moving an animal suffices; the method must suit its species. This establishes the question: does the baraita restrict the available modes of acquisition, particularly by excluding riding?
קָתָנֵי מִיהַת: אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה אֶחָד מוֹשֵׁךְ וְאֶחָד מַנְהִיג, מוֹשֵׁךְ וּמַנְהִיג – אִין. אֲבָל רָכוּב לָא!
The Gemara focuses on the case where one person pulls and another drives. Those two actions are listed as acts of acquisition, while riding is not mentioned. It seeks to infer that a rider does not acquire. This inference assumes that the list identifies the valid methods and excludes others. It challenges the possibility that riding itself effects acquisition.
הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ רָכוּב, וְהָא דְּקָתָנֵי מוֹשֵׁךְ וּמַנְהִיג – לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר: עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא מְשִׁיכָה בְּגָמָל וְהַנְהָגָה בַּחֲמוֹר, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן דַּאֲפִילּוּ אִיפְּכָא נָמֵי קָנֵי.
The response proposes that a rider also acquires, so the omission proves nothing. Pulling and driving were mentioned to oppose Rabbi Yehuda. Under this initial explanation, the first tanna also validates reversing Rabbi Yehuda's required methods. The list therefore highlights a particular disagreement rather than providing an exhaustive inventory. This defeats the argument from omission, but does not yet provide positive proof for riding.
אִי הָכִי, לִיעָרְבִינְהוּ וְלִתְנִינְהוּ: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁהָיוּ מוֹשְׁכִין וּמַנְהִיגִין בֵּין בְּגָמָל בֵּין בַּחֲמוֹר!
The Gemara tests the response against the baraita's precise structure. If pulling and driving work for both species, everything could have been stated together. Why not teach that two people pull or drive either a camel or a donkey? The objection assumes that separating the cases reflects a legal distinction. It requires qualification of the previous response's broad explanation.
אִיכָּא חַד צַד דְּלָא קָנֵי: אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי מְשִׁיכָה בַּחֲמוֹר, וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי הַנְהָגָה בְּגָמָל.
The answer establishes that the first tanna also rejects one method. One version identifies it as pulling a donkey; another identifies it as driving a camel. A blanket formulation permitting both methods for both species would therefore be inaccurate. The disagreement with Rabbi Yehuda is narrower: the first tanna permits one reversed method, not both. The baraita can thus address the suitability of a method to an animal without excluding riding.
וְאִית דְּמוֹתֵיב מִסֵּיפָא: בְּמִדָּה זוֹ קָנָה. ״בְּמִדָּה זוֹ״ לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? לָאו לְמַעוֹטֵי רָכוּב?! לָא, לְמַעוֹטֵי אִיפְּכָא.
An alternative version derives the objection from the closing phrase, 'In this manner he acquires.' That wording appears to restrict acquisition to the stated method. The challenger proposes that it excludes riding. The response instead applies the exclusion to a reversed method of pulling or driving. There is a genuine restriction, but it need not concern the rider.
אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה! אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ צַד אֶחָד דְּלֹא קָנָה: אִית דְּאָמְרִי מְשִׁיכָה בַּחֲמוֹר, וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי הַנְהָגָה בְּגָמָל.
A difficulty now arises: if the first tanna excludes the reversed methods, how does he differ from Rabbi Yehuda? The answer returns to the distinction between one reversed method and both. Rabbi Yehuda requires both of his stated pairings, while the first tanna rejects only one alternative. The two versions disagree about which alternative is invalid. A genuine disagreement remains, and 'in this manner' still proves nothing against riding.
תָּא שְׁמַע: אֶחָד רָכוּב חֲמוֹר וְאֶחָד תָּפוּס בְּמוֹסֵירָה – זֶה קָנָה חֲמוֹר, וְזֶה קָנָה מוֹסֵירָה. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: רָכוּב קָנֵי!
A baraita describes one person riding a donkey and another holding its reins. It awards the donkey to the rider and the reins to the holder. This appears to be explicit evidence that riding acquires. The proof assumes that 'riding' means being mounted without an additional act of directing the animal. The discussion moves from inference based on omission to a source that expressly mentions a rider.
הָכָא נָמֵי בְּמַנְהִיג בְּרַגְלָיו. אִי הָכִי, נִקְנֵי נָמֵי רָכוּב בְּמוֹסֵירָה! אֵימָא: זֶה קָנָה חֲמוֹר וַחֲצִי מוֹסֵירָה, וְזֶה קָנָה חֲצִי מוֹסֵירָה.
The Gemara interprets this baraita too as referring to a rider directing the animal with his feet. Acquisition of the donkey then rests on driving, so riding alone remains unproven. A new difficulty follows: why does the rider not also acquire a share of the reins moving with the animal? The proposed reading awards the donkey and half the reins to the rider, and the other half to the holder. This provisional division accounts for both participants, but its lifting mechanism requires examination.
בִּשְׁלָמָא רָכוּב קָנֵי, דְּקָמַגְבַּהּ לֵיהּ בֶּן דַּעַת. אֶלָּא תָּפוּס בְּמוֹסֵירָה בְּמַאי קָנֵי?
The Gemara tests whether dividing the reins in half rests on valid acquisition. The rider seemingly has a basis, because a person with legal intent lifts the other end. The holder lacks equivalent human participation at the opposite end, where the animal supports the reins. Merely gripping one end therefore does not explain acquisition of half the hanging reins. The question reveals that being involved in the scene does not necessarily mean participating in a valid act of lifting.
אֵימָא: זֶה קָנָה חֲמוֹר וְכוּלֵּיהּ מוֹסֵירָה, וְזֶה קָנָה מַה שֶּׁתָּפוּס בְּיָדוֹ.
A revised division is proposed: the rider acquires the donkey and the reins, while the holder acquires what is in his hand. Here, 'all the reins' is subject to the express exception of the portion held by the other person. The proposal abandons the holder's acquisition of the hanging section. It still assumes that the holder's lifting can complete the rider's acquisition of the remaining reins. This is not a final conclusion, but a revision the Gemara immediately tests.
הַאי מַאי?! אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ קָנָה חֲבֵירוֹ – הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּקָא מַגְבַּהּ לֵיהּ אַדַּעְתָּא דְּחַבְרֵיהּ. הַאי אַדַּעְתָּא דִּידֵיהּ קָא מַגְבַּהּ לֵיהּ: אִיהוּ לָא קָנֵי, לְאַחֲרִינֵי מַקְנֵי?!
The Gemara challenges the assumption that the holder lifts on the rider's behalf. Even if lifting a found object for another person acquires it for that person, the lifter must intend to acquire for him. Here, the holder acts for himself. He does not acquire the hanging section himself, so his own acquisition cannot serve as the basis for acquiring that section for someone else. This directly connects to the discussion of lifting a found object for another: both intention and the lifter's own acquisition must be examined.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: זֶה קָנָה חֲמוֹר וּבֵית פַּגֶּיהָ, וְזֶה קָנָה מַה שֶׁתָּפוּס בְּיָדוֹ – וְהַשְּׁאָר לֹא קָנָה, לֹא זֶה וְלֹא זֶה.
Rav Ashi divides the reins according to sections with distinct bases for acquisition. The rider acquires the donkey and the portion fitted at its head. The holder acquires the portion in his hand. Neither acquires the remaining section. This resolves the problem without attributing an intention to benefit the rider to the holder, or awarding the holder a section lacking an effective act of lifting.
רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם כִּדְקָתָנֵי – הוֹאִיל וְיָכוֹל לְנַתְּקָהּ וְלַהֲבִיאָהּ אֶצְלוֹ.
Rabbi Abbahu proposes retaining the baraita's plain wording. The rider acquires the donkey, and the holder acquires all the reins. His reason is that the holder can pull the reins away and bring them to himself. On this proposal, the ability to obtain full control suffices without the lifting required in the preceding analysis. This offers a different basis for acquisition, not merely a different division of the sections.
וְהָא דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ בְּרוּתָא הִיא, דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי: טַלִּית שֶׁהִיא מוּנַּחַת חֶצְיָהּ עַל גַּבֵּי קַרְקַע וְחֶצְיָהּ עַל גַּבֵּי עַמּוּד, וּבָא אֶחָד וְהִגְבִּיהַּ חֶצְיָהּ מֵעַל גַּבֵּי קַרְקַע וּבָא אַחֵר וְהִגְבִּיהַּ חֶצְיָהּ מֵעַל גַּבֵּי עַמּוּד, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּקַמָּא קָנֵי וּבָתְרָא לָא קָנֵי, הוֹאִיל וְיָכוֹל לְנַתְּקָ[הּ] וְלַהֲבִיאָ[הּ] אֶצְלוֹ?! אֶלָּא הָא דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ בְּרוּתָא הִיא.
The Gemara rejects Rabbi Abbahu's statement through a case of a garment lying partly on the ground and partly on a pillar. One person lifts the section on the ground, and another then lifts the section on the pillar. If the ability to pull everything over were sufficient, the first person would already own the entire garment and exclude the second. The Gemara rejects that result: a potential future pull does not replace actual lifting. Rabbi Abbahu's proposal is expressly rejected, sharpening the distinction between possible control and an act of acquisition.
תָּא שְׁמַע, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: רָכוּב בַּשָּׂדֶה וּמַנְהִיג בָּעִיר – קָנָה! הָכָא נָמֵי מַנְהִיג בְּרַגְלָיו. אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ מַנְהִיג! תְּרֵי גַּוְונֵי מַנְהִיג.
Rabbi Eliezer's teaching is cited: riding in a field and driving in a city effect acquisition. Again, this appears to support acquisition by riding, and again the rider is interpreted as directing the animal with his feet. The Gemara objects that the rider is then also a driver. The answer is that the source distinguishes two forms of driving, not necessarily two foundations of acquisition. The descriptions remain distinct without proving that riding without directing acquires.
אִי הָכִי, רָכוּב בָּעִיר מַאי טַעְמָא לָא קָנֵי? אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: לְפִי שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכָּן שֶׁל בְּנֵי אָדָם לִרְכּוֹב בָּעִיר.
Interpreting the rider as directing with his feet raises another question. If he performs an act of driving, why does the teaching imply that riding in a city does not acquire? Rav Kahana answers that people do not ordinarily ride in a city. His response gives customary local conduct a role in determining a method's validity. At this stage, however, it has not explained why an unusual action loses its acquisitive effect.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב כָּהֲנָא: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, הִגְבִּיהַּ אַרְנָקִי בְּשַׁבָּת, שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכָּן שֶׁל בְּנֵי אָדָם לְהַגְבִּיהַּ אַרְנָקִי בְּשַׁבָּת, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָא קָנֵי? אֶלָּא מַאי דַּעֲבַד – עֲבַד, וְקָנֵי, הָכָא נָמֵי מַאי דַּעֲבַד – עֲבַד, וּקְנִי.
Rav Ashi objects from the example of lifting a purse on Shabbat. That action is also outside ordinary conduct because of Shabbat restrictions, yet an acquisition accomplished by lifting is not undone by that fact. The comparison separates whether an act is appropriate or customary from whether it effects acquisition. Riding in a city should therefore not fail merely because it is unusual. This challenges Rav Kahana's reason when taken alone; it does not permit prohibited conduct on Shabbat.
אֶלָּא בְּמִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר עָסְקִינַן, דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: קְנֵי כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁבְּנֵי אָדָם קוֹנִין.
The Gemara places Rabbi Eliezer's teaching in the context of a sale. The seller told the buyer to acquire in the way people ordinarily acquire. Custom now matters because it forms part of the owner's condition, not because every unusual act is inherently ineffective. Riding in a city fails to meet that condition within the framework described here. This resolves the purse objection: a found object has no seller imposing such a condition, and the page ends by distinguishing an act's acquisitive power from the terms of the transfer.
Draw a donkey, its reins, a rider directing it with his feet, and a person holding the reins. Mark the section at the animal's head, the section held in the hand, and the intervening section. Explain who acquires each section under the successive proposals and under Rav Ashi, and why.
The sources examined here do not establish that riding alone acquires, since the rider can be understood as directing the animal with his feet. The discussion of the reins requires an actual act of acquisition and attention to the participants' intentions, not merely the ability to pull an object closer. The page ends by shifting to a sale in which the seller makes customary acquisition a condition.
Test yourself before marking the lesson complete.
Why does mentioning pulling and driving not prove that riding fails to acquire?
Original explanations and translations: Bonei Atalmud. Excerpts were checked against the site’s Gemara text. Explanations and exercises have not undergone rabbinic review and are not halakhic rulings.
