Daf 8a: Dividing Value, Joint Lifting, and Acquisition for Another

Here is the complete Gemara text of this daf, word for word, divided into the stages of the sugya: Mishnah, question, kushya, terutz, raya and conclusion. Read each stage in the source first, then the explanation.

1. 01·TerutzBava Metzia 8a

   דְּחַזְיָא לִקְטַנִּים.

   The page opens in the middle of an answer to the preceding discussion about dividing a garment. Even after cutting, its pieces can fit children. It therefore remains possible to read “they divide” as physically dividing the garment. The assumption is that the division is not complete destruction, since the pieces retain a suitable use. This is a local answer, not yet an explanation of every case in the Mishnah.

2. 02·TerutzBava Metzia 8a

   וְהָא דְּאָמַר רָבָא: אִם הָיְתָה טַלִּית מוּזְהֶבֶת – חוֹלְקִין, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּפָלְגִי לַהּ, הָא אַפְסְדוּהָ! הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, דְּחַזְיָא לִבְנֵי מְלָכִים.

   The Gemara challenges the proposal from Rava’s statement that a gold-adorned garment is also divided. Cutting such an expensive garment appears destructive, making physical division seem unsuitable. The answer is that its pieces remain suitable for royal children. Their use explains how even this luxurious fabric can remain useful after division. At this stage, the Gemara still defends the possibility of dividing the object itself.

3. 03·TerutzBava Metzia 8a

   וְהָא דִּתְנַן: הָיוּ שְׁנַיִם רוֹכְבִין עַל גַּבֵּי בְּהֵמָה וְכוּ׳, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּפָלְגִי לַהּ? הָא אַפְסְדוּהָ! בִּשְׁלָמָא טְהוֹרָה – חַזְיָא לְבָשָׂר. אֶלָּא טְמֵאָה, הָא אַפְסְדוּהָ! אֶלָּא לִדְמֵי, הָכָא נָמֵי לִדְמֵי.

   The animal case undermines the preceding explanation. For a kosher animal, division as meat is conceivable, but a nonkosher animal offers no parallel answer to the concern about loss. Thus, “they divide” need not mean cutting the animal; it can mean dividing its monetary value. The same interpretation can apply to the previously discussed case. The methodological point matters: the word “division” does not itself prove physical division.

4. 04·RayaBava Metzia 8a

   אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת, הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ – קָנָה חֲבֵירוֹ. דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ לֹא קָנָה חֲבֵירוֹ, תֵּיעָשֶׂה זוֹ כְּמִי שֶׁמּוּנַּחַת עַל גַּבֵּי קַרְקַע, וְזוֹ כְּמִי שֶׁמּוּנַּחַת עַל גַּבֵּי קַרְקַע, וְלֹא יִקְנֶה לֹא זֶה וְלֹא זֶה. אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ – קָנָה חֲבֵירוֹ.

   Rami bar Ḥama seeks to infer from the Mishnah that lifting a found object for another gives that person ownership. At this stage, the precise clause supporting his inference has not yet been identified. His proof assumes that in a joint lifting, each participant needs the other’s act to complete the lifting of the garment on his behalf. If the other’s act cannot benefit him, that contribution is treated, relative to him, as though the garment remained on the ground. Neither participant would then have completed an effective acquisition by lifting. Since the Mishnah recognizes acquisition by both, Rami bar Ḥama concludes that one can acquire a found object for another.

5. 05·TerutzBava Metzia 8a

   אָמַר רָבָא, לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ: הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ – לֹא קָנָה חֲבֵירוֹ. וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא: מִגּוֹ דְּזָכֵי לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ זָכֵי נָמֵי לְחַבְרֵיהּ.

   Rava rejects the move from joint acquisition to a general rule about acquiring for another. One can maintain that lifting a found object solely for another does not give that person ownership. Here, however, each participant also acquires for himself. Because his act works for himself, it can also work for his partner. Rava thus preserves the Mishnah’s result without accepting Rami bar Ḥama’s general conclusion. Here, migo describes an extension of an act’s acquisitive effect, not evidence that a claim is credible.

6. 06·RayaBava Metzia 8a

   תִּדַּע שֶׁאִילּוּ אָמַר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ: ״צֵא וּגְנוֹב לִי״, וְגָנַב – פָּטוּר. וְשׁוּתָּפִין שֶׁגָּנְבוּ – חַיָּיבִין. מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן: מִגּוֹ דְּזָכֵי לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ זָכֵי נָמֵי לְחַבְרֵיהּ. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

   Rava supports his distinction through the difference between commissioning a theft and stealing jointly. Someone who tells an agent to steal is exempt from theft liability arising through the agent’s act; this does not exempt the thief himself. The background principle is that agency does not operate for a transgression. Partners who steal, by contrast, are liable. The proposed explanation is that each acts for himself, allowing his act to operate for his partner within the joint theft as well. This supports the structural distinction between acting solely for another and acting jointly; it does not permit theft.

7. 07·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 8a

   אָמַר רָבָא, הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָמְרַתְּ אָמְרִינַן מִגּוֹ: חֵרֵשׁ וּפִקֵּחַ שֶׁהִגְבִּיהוּ מְצִיאָה, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁקָּנָה חֵרֵשׁ – קָנָה פִּקֵּחַ.

   Rava now proposes another application of migo. A ḥeresh and a pike’aḥ jointly lift a found object, and the initial formulation says that because the ḥeresh acquires, the pike’aḥ acquires too. This is a proposed result within the discussion, not its eventual conclusion. The case tests whether acts by two people with unequal acquisitive capacities can be combined. The Gemara will now examine which parts of this structure actually hold.

8. 08·KushyaBava Metzia 8a

   בִּשְׁלָמָא חֵרֵשׁ קָנָה – דְּקָא מַגְבַּהּ לֵיהּ בֶּן דַּעַת. אֶלָּא פִּקֵּחַ בְּמַאי קָנָה?

   The Gemara objects that the two participants are not symmetrical. At this stage, acquisition by the ḥeresh seems understandable because a legally competent person lifts for him. The pike’aḥ, however, needs the ḥeresh’s lifting to complete his own acquisition. What gives that lifting the power to acquire for him? Simply joining two people in one act does not guarantee acquisition for both.

9. 09·TerutzBava Metzia 8a

   אֶלָּא אֵימָא: חֵרֵשׁ – קָנָה, פִּקֵּחַ – לָא קָנָה. וּמַאי מִגּוֹ? מִגּוֹ דִּשְׁנֵי חֵרְשִׁין בְּעָלְמָא קָנוּ, הַאי נָמֵי קָנֵי.

   The Gemara proposes a first correction: the ḥeresh acquires, but the pike’aḥ does not. The word migo must now also be reinterpreted. The proposed comparison is to two ḥereshim who lift together and acquire under a rabbinic arrangement. If a ḥeresh can acquire alongside another ḥeresh, the suggestion is that he should acquire alongside a pike’aḥ as well. This is an intermediate proposal that tries to preserve only the ḥeresh’s acquisition.

10. 10·KushyaBava Metzia 8a

    הַאי מַאי? אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ קָנָה חֲבֵירוֹ, הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּקָא מַגְבַּהּ לֵיהּ אַדַּעְתָּא דְּחַבְרֵיהּ. הַאי אַדַּעְתָּא דִּידֵיהּ קָא מַגְבַּהּ לֵיהּ, אִיהוּ לָא קָנֵי – לְאַחֲרִינֵי מַקְנֵי?!

    The Gemara rejects this correction too by examining intention. Even if lifting a found object for another can work, that applies when the lifting is performed for that person. Here the pike’aḥ acts to acquire for himself, but fails to acquire. There is therefore no basis for his act to acquire for someone else through his own acquisition. The principle of acquiring for another through acquiring for oneself requires an effective personal acquisition, not merely the desire to acquire.

11. 11·TerutzBava Metzia 8a

    אֶלָּא אֵימָא: מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁלֹּא קָנָה פִּקֵּחַ – לֹא קָנָה חֵרֵשׁ.

    The formulation is finally reversed: because the pike’aḥ does not acquire, the ḥeresh does not acquire either. The pike’aḥ receives no effective lifting from the ḥeresh to complete his acquisition. Once his own acquisition fails, there is no personal acquisition through which his act can also acquire for the ḥeresh. Neither therefore acquires through this particular joint act. This is the conclusion for this case, not a denial of every possible acquisition by a ḥeresh.

12. 12·TerutzBava Metzia 8a

    וְכִי תֵּימָא, מַאי שְׁנָא מִשְּׁנֵי חֵרְשִׁין דְּעָלְמָא – הָתָם תַּקִּינוּ לְהוּ רַבָּנַן דְּלָא אָתֵי לְאִנְּצוֹיֵי. הָכָא מֵימָר אָמַר: פִּקֵּחַ לָא קָנֵי, אֲנָא אֶקְנֵי?

    It remains to explain why two ḥereshim can acquire together. The Gemara answers that the Sages instituted acquisition there to prevent quarrelling. In the mixed case, the ḥeresh sees that the pike’aḥ also failed to acquire. On the Gemara’s account, he does not expect to acquire when his legally competent partner did not. The rationale for the enactment therefore does not require granting him acquisition here. The distinction concerns the purpose of the rabbinic arrangement, not validation of the lifting under ordinary acquisition rules.

13. 13·The Gemara asksBava Metzia 8a

    אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַדָּא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: דִּיּוּקֵיהּ דְּרָמֵי בַּר חָמָא מֵהֵיכָא? אִי נֵימָא מֵרֵישָׁא ״שְׁנַיִם אוֹחֲזִין בְּטַלִּית״, הָתָם הַאי קָאָמַר ״כּוּלָּהּ שֶׁלִּי וַאֲנָא אַגְּבַּהְתַּהּ כּוּלַּהּ״, וְהַאי אָמַר ״כּוּלָּהּ שֶׁלִּי וַאֲנָא אַגְּבַּהְתַּהּ כּוּלַּהּ״.

    Rav Aḥa son of Rav Adda asks Rav Ashi for Rami bar Ḥama’s precise source. The opening case of two people holding a garment is insufficient. Each claims that he alone lifted and acquired the entire garment. A court’s division amid conflicting claims does not prove that a valid joint lifting occurred. The source must establish the mode of acquisition itself, not merely how uncertainty is adjudicated.

14. 14·RayaBava Metzia 8a

    אֶלָּא מֵהָא דְּקָתָנֵי ״זֶה אוֹמֵר כּוּלָּהּ שֶׁלִּי וְזֶה אוֹמֵר כּוּלָּהּ שֶׁלִּי״ הָא תּוּ לְמָה לִי? אֶלָּא מִמִּשְׁנָה יְתֵירָה שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ – קָנָה חֲבֵירוֹ.

    The Gemara proposes learning from the repeated wording that each says, “It is all mine.” The conflict between the two holders apparently already appears, so this additional formulation seems redundant. That surplus is used to propose an additional rule about acquisition through another person’s lifting. The proof rests not merely on the words’ meaning, but on the assumption that the repetition serves no other purpose. If it has an independent function, the proof loses its foundation.

15. 15·KushyaBava Metzia 8a

    וְהָא אוֹקֵימְנָא רֵישָׁא בִּמְצִיאָה, וְסֵיפָא בְּמִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר!

    The Gemara recalls the earlier explanation that the first clause concerns a found object and the later clause a purchase. Under that reading, the two formulations are not unused repetition. They apply the discussion to two different ways the object may have reached the litigants. There is therefore no surplus from which to prove acquisition through lifting for another. This directly connects the argument to the analysis of the Mishnah’s wording at the chapter’s opening.

16. 16·RayaBava Metzia 8a

    אֶלָּא מִסֵּיפָא: ״זֶה אוֹמֵר כּוּלָּהּ שֶׁלִּי וְזֶה אוֹמֵר חֶצְיָהּ שֶׁלִּי״, הָא תּוּ לְמָה לִי? אֶלָּא מִמִּשְׁנָה יְתֵירָה שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ – קָנָה חֲבֵירוֹ.

    The search moves to the case in which one claimant says, “It is all mine,” and the other says, “Half is mine.” Again, the Gemara asks why an additional case is needed. The proposal is that this addition teaches that one person’s lifting can benefit another. Once more, the proof relies on redundancy in the Mishnah, not an explicit description of the lifters’ intentions. We must therefore test whether the case is needed to teach something else.

17. 17·KushyaBava Metzia 8a

    וּמִמַּאי דְּבִמְצִיאָה? דִּלְמָא בְּמִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר? וְכִי תֵּימָא: אִי בְּמִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא הַאי דְּקָאָמַר ״חֶצְיָהּ שֶׁלִּי״ לֶהֱוֵי כְּמֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה וְלִיפְּטַר. קָמַשְׁמַע לַן דְּהַאי אִיעָרוֹמֵי קָא מַעֲרִים. סָבַר: אִי אָמֵינָא ״כּוּלָּהּ שֶׁלִּי״, בָּעֵינָא אִשְׁתְּבוֹעֵי, אֵימָא הָכִי, דְּאֶהְוֵי כְּמֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה וְאִיפְּטַר!

    The Gemara objects that the “half is mine” case may concern a purchase rather than a found object. That possibility cannot be dismissed as teaching nothing new, since it can teach an oath requirement. One might treat the half-claimant like someone returning lost property, because he does not demand everything, and exempt him from an oath. The Mishnah teaches that no such exemption is granted, since reducing a claim may be a calculated way to evade the oath. This does not prove that this particular litigant lies; it explains why the form of his claim does not automatically earn an exemption. The clause thus has an independent function, defeating the redundancy argument.

18. 18·RayaBava Metzia 8a

    אֶלָּא מֵהָא, הָיוּ שְׁנַיִם רוֹכְבִין עַל גַּבֵּי בְּהֵמָה, הָא תּוּ לְמָה לִי? אֶלָּא מִמִּשְׁנָה יְתֵירָה שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ – קָנָה חֲבֵירוֹ.

    The next proposed source is the case of two people riding an animal. After the garment cases, another case of two possessors may appear unnecessary merely to establish division. It is therefore proposed as a source for acquisition by lifting a found object for another. Although the case describes riding rather than lifting a garment, the proposed redundancy is used to teach a further acquisition principle. Again, the proof depends on riding having no independent lesson.

19. 19·KushyaBava Metzia 8a

    וְדִלְמָא, הָא קָמַשְׁמַע לַן דְּרוֹכֵב נָמֵי קָנֵי!

    The Gemara proposes an independent lesson for the riding case: a rider can acquire. If so, adding the animal case does not repeat the garment laws. It may teach a mode of acquisition not yet established. This defeats the redundancy argument without settling all the details of acquisition by riding here. The question prepares the ground for the discussion opening at the page’s end.

20. 20·RayaBava Metzia 8a

    אֶלָּא מִסֵּיפָא: בִּזְמַן שֶׁהֵן מוֹדִין אוֹ שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן עֵדִים – חוֹלְקִין בְּלֹא שְׁבוּעָה. בְּמַאי? אִי בְּמִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר, צְרִיכָא לְמֵימַר?! אֶלָּא לָאו בִּמְצִיאָה, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ קָנָה חֲבֵירוֹ.

    The final source is the closing clause: when the parties agree or have witnesses, they divide without an oath. In this context, the agreement or testimony establishes acquisition by both, rather than merely presenting conflicting claims. If the case concerns a purchase, the Gemara treats the result as too obvious to justify the addition. It therefore reads the clause as concerning a found object and finds recognition of acquisition through a joint act. This answers the weakness of the first proposed source: there is evidence of acquisition itself, not merely judicial division. Rami bar Ḥama seeks to derive the general rule that lifting for another gives that person ownership.

21. 21·TerutzBava Metzia 8a

    וְרָבָא אָמַר לָךְ: מִגּוֹ דְּזָכֵי לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ זָכֵי נָמֵי לְחַבְרֵיהּ.

    Rava can still answer that the clause concerns joint acquisition. Each person acquires for himself, and through that acquisition his act also benefits his partner. The source therefore establishes that joint acquisition is possible, but does not compel Rami bar Ḥama’s broader rule. In particular, it does not prove the case of someone lifting solely for another without acquiring for himself. At the end of the argument, we must distinguish the structure presented by the Mishnah from the conceptual foundation each Amora gives it.

22. 22·The Gemara asksBava Metzia 8a

    הָיוּ שְׁנַיִם רוֹכְבִין. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף, אָמַר לִי רַב יְהוּדָה:

    The Gemara returns to the Mishnah’s heading, “There were two riding.” This opens a new topic concerning riding and acquisition. Rav Yosef begins reporting something he heard from Rav Yehuda. The content of that report is absent from the supplied passage, so no ruling should be assigned to it here. This is the page boundary: the new discussion begins, but the substance of the report continues beyond it.

1. 1What does the discussion of dividing a nonkosher animal establish? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
2. 2How does Rava explain joint acquisition without accepting Rami bar Ḥama’s broader rule? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
3. 3Why is the proposal that only the ḥeresh acquires rejected? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
4. 4What alternative lesson blocks the proof from the “half is mine” clause? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
5. 5What remains unproven for Rava from the final clause about agreement or witnesses? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.