Daf 5b: The Garment Oath: Monetary Suspicion and Oath Credibility

Here is the complete Gemara text of this daf, word for word, divided into the stages of the sugya: Mishnah, question, kushya, terutz, raya and conclusion. Read each stage in the source first, then the explanation.

1. 01·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 5b

   וְתַקַּנְתָּא לְתַקַּנְתָּא לָא עָבְדִינַן.

   This sentence closes the preceding page’s discussion of an oath obligation in the shepherd case. When the obligation rests on the rabbinic hesset oath, the Gemara does not add the enactment allowing the opposing claimant to swear and collect. That opposing-party enactment addresses a defendant who is disqualified from swearing. Here, however, the Gemara does not build a second layer of enactment upon an obligation already created by enactment. This route must therefore be distinguished from a case where the original oath obligation is biblical.

2. 02·KushyaBava Metzia 5b

   וְתִיפּוֹק לֵיהּ דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ רוֹעֶה! וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: סְתָם רוֹעֶה פָּסוּל.

   The Gemara asks why it was necessary to establish that the shepherd in the preceding case had wrongfully taken property. Rav Yehuda says that an ordinary shepherd is disqualified from testimony, which also bears on his eligibility to swear. The usual concern is that shepherds allow animals to graze in other people’s fields. The objection assumes that being a shepherd is itself sufficient for disqualification. On that assumption, the specific evidence about his conduct seems unnecessary.

3. 03·TerutzBava Metzia 5b

   לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דִידֵיהּ, הָא דְּעָלְמָא. דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי, אֲנַן חֵיוָתָא לְרוֹעָה הֵיכִי מָסְרִינַן? וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״לִפְנֵי עִוֵּר לֹא תִתֵּן מִכְשֹׁל״! אֶלָּא חֲזָקָה: אֵין אָדָם חוֹטֵא וְלֹא לוֹ.

   The Gemara distinguishes a shepherd of his own animals from a shepherd of other people’s animals. A shepherd of his own flock benefits personally from forbidden grazing, so the usual suspicion applies. For someone tending another person’s animals, the presumption is that a person does not sin without personal benefit. The Gemara reinforces this from the practice of entrusting animals to shepherds: if every shepherd were presumed to offend, doing so would raise the prohibition of placing a stumbling block before another. This explains why the preceding case required specific evidence against the shepherd rather than merely identifying his occupation.

4. 04·TerutzBava Metzia 5b

   זֶה יִשָּׁבַע שֶׁאֵין לוֹ בָּהּ פָּחוֹת מֵחֶצְיָהּ [וְכוּ׳]. עַל דְּאִית לֵיהּ מִשְׁתְּבַע, אוֹ עַל דְּלֵית לֵיהּ מִשְׁתְּבַע! אָמַר רַב הוּנָא, דְּאָמַר: שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בָּהּ וְאֵין לִי בָּהּ פָּחוֹת מֵחֶצְיָהּ.

   The Gemara returns to the Mishnah and examines the wording that he has no less than half of it. It asks whether he is affirming a share that he owns or merely denying a smaller share without positively asserting ownership. Rav Huna supplies the fuller formula: I have a share in it, and I have no less than half of it. The addition first affirms a right in the garment and then defines its minimum extent. The oath thus rests on a substantive ownership claim rather than an ambiguous negative formulation.

5. 05·TerutzBava Metzia 5b

   וְנֵימָא שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁכּוּלָּהּ שֶׁלִּי. וּמִי יָהֲבִינַן לֵיהּ כּוּלַּהּ?

   The Gemara proposes a more direct formula: I swear that all of it is mine. This matches each holder’s original claim. The answer is that the court does not award him the entire garment. The oath accompanies receipt of the share awarded to him, so it should not require him to swear to ownership of the whole. Two structural elements now separate: the scope of the claim and the scope of the oath required for division.

6. 06·TerutzBava Metzia 5b

   וְנֵימָא שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁחֶצְיָהּ שֶׁלִּי – מַרַע לֵיהּ לְדִיבּוּרֵיהּ.

   The next proposal is to swear that half is mine, matching the share received. The Gemara rejects this because the wording weakens his earlier statement. Saying half is mine sounds like a retreat from the claim that all of it is mine. Owning half does not logically contradict owning the whole, but that is how the formulation sounds within this dispute. The required wording must fit the division without presenting the claimant as retracting.

7. 07·TerutzBava Metzia 5b

   הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי מַרַע לֵיהּ לְדִיבּוּרֵיהּ. דְּאָמַר: כּוּלָּהּ שֶׁלִּי, וּלְדִבְרֵיכֶם – שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בָּהּ וְאֵין לִי בָּהּ פָּחוֹת מֵחֶצְיָהּ.

   The Gemara objects that saying I have no less than half may also sound like a weakened claim. The answer supplies the framework in which the oath is spoken. The holder maintains that the whole garment is his, but says that on the court’s terms he swears to owning at least half. His original claim remains intact while the oath fits the practical adjudication. The words on your terms distinguish the litigant’s position from the framework imposed by the court.

8. 08·TerutzBava Metzia 5b

   וְכִי מֵאַחַר שֶׁזֶּה תָּפוּס וְעוֹמֵד וְזֶה תָּפוּס וְעוֹמֵד, שְׁבוּעָה זוֹ לָמָּה? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שְׁבוּעָה זוֹ תַּקָּנַת חֲכָמִים הִיא, שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא כׇּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד הוֹלֵךְ וְתוֹקֵף בְּטַלִּיתוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ וְאוֹמֵר: ״שֶׁלִּי הוּא״.

   After clarifying the wording, the Gemara asks why any oath is necessary. Both parties hold the garment, and the division rests on their possession. Rabbi Yoḥanan answers that the oath is a rabbinic enactment designed to prevent someone from seizing another person’s garment. Without an oath, a person could manufacture a share through seizure and assertion alone. Possession therefore explains the basis for division, while the oath protects the procedure from abuse.

9. 09·KushyaBava Metzia 5b

   וְנֵימָא מִיגּוֹ דַּחֲשִׁיד אַמָּמוֹנָא חֲשִׁיד נָמֵי אַשְּׁבוּעָתָא?

   The Gemara challenges the enactment’s deterrent force. If the holder may be willing to take property that is not his, why expect him to recoil from a false oath. The objection assumes that willingness to commit a monetary offense also indicates willingness to swear falsely. Here, miggo means an inference from one suspicion to another, not the usual argument based on an available stronger claim. This opens the investigation of the relationship between monetary honesty and a person’s attitude toward oaths.

10. 10·TerutzBava Metzia 5b

    לָא אָמְרִינַן מִיגּוֹ דַּחֲשִׁיד אַמָּמוֹנָא חֲשִׁיד אַשְּׁבוּעָתָא. דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי, הַאי דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא מוֹדֶה מִקְצָת הַטַּעֲנָה יִשָּׁבַע, נֵימָא מִיגּוֹ דַּחֲשִׁיד אַמָּמוֹנָא חֲשִׁיד אַשְּׁבוּעָתָא.

    The Gemara answers that monetary suspicion does not automatically imply suspicion concerning oaths. It offers support from the biblical oath imposed on someone who partially admits a claim. There too, the defendant may be denying part of a debt, yet the Torah requires him to swear. If monetary suspicion itself undermined the oath, this obligation would be difficult to explain. At this stage, it is a proposed proof for separating the suspicions, and the next step tests whether the cases are truly comparable.

11. 11·KushyaBava Metzia 5b

    הָתָם אִשְׁתְּמוֹטֵי קָא מִשְׁתְּמִיט לֵיהּ, כִּדְרַבָּה.

    The Gemara rejects the proof from partial admission by invoking Rabbah’s explanation. The borrower may not intend to steal the unpaid balance, but merely to delay payment until funds become available. His denial would then be temporary evasion rather than evidence of an intention to steal permanently. The oath can interrupt that evasion and force him to confront the truth now. This case therefore does not prove how someone genuinely suspected of theft would behave.

12. 12·RayaBava Metzia 5b

    תִּדַּע דְּאָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: הַכּוֹפֵר בְּמִלְוֶה – כָּשֵׁר לְעֵדוּת. בְּפִיקָּדוֹן – פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת.

    The Gemara supports the evasion explanation through Rav Idi bar Avin’s report in Rav Ḥisda’s name. Someone who denies a loan remains eligible to testify, whereas someone who denies a deposit is disqualified. Loan money may be spent, so an inability to repay can explain a temporary denial. A deposited object should be preserved and returned intact, making denial a different kind of concern. The discussion will clarify that disqualification for denying a deposit requires circumstances that exclude temporary evasion, so this distinction must be read together with what follows.

13. 13·KushyaBava Metzia 5b

    אֶלָּא הָא דְּתָנֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִין צְרִיכִין כְּפִירָה בְּמִקְצָת וְהוֹדָאָה בְּמִקְצָת – שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל, נוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר, נֵימָא מִיגּוֹ דַּחֲשִׁיד אַמָּמוֹנָא חֲשִׁיד אַשְּׁבוּעָתָא!

    The Gemara now tests the proposed rule through Rami bar Ḥama’s teaching about the four guardians. In his account, the oath obligation under discussion requires partial denial and partial admission for an unpaid guardian, borrower, paid guardian, and renter. Here the claim concerns deposited property, so denial seemingly already raises suspicion of wrongful appropriation. If monetary suspicion entails oath suspicion, how can an oath be imposed on the guardian. This case seeks to overcome the rejection of the loan example, where postponing payment was easier to explain.

14. 14·TerutzBava Metzia 5b

    הָתָם נָמֵי אִשְׁתְּמוֹטֵי קָא מִשְׁתְּמִיט. סָבַר: מַשְׁכַּחְנָא לְגַנָּב וְתָפֵיסְנָא לֵיהּ. אִי נָמֵי מַשְׁכַּחְנָא לֵיהּ בַּאֲגַם וּמַיְיתֵינָא לֵיהּ.

    The Gemara answers that a guardian too may be evading temporarily. He may hope to find and catch the thief, or locate the animal in a marsh and bring it back. On this explanation, the denial buys time rather than serving a plan to deprive the owner permanently. The guardians’ case therefore also fails to prove that an oath works for someone genuinely suspected of theft. The distinction is not simply loan versus deposit, but intended delay versus intended deprivation.

15. 15·KushyaBava Metzia 5b

    אִי הָכִי, הַכּוֹפֵר בְּפִקָּדוֹן אַמַּאי פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת? נֵימָא: אִשְׁתְּמוֹטֵי קָא מִשְׁתְּמִיט, סָבַר עַד דְּבָחֵשְׁנָא וּמְשַׁכַּחְנָא לֵיהּ!

    The possibility of explaining denial of a deposit as evasion creates an objection to Rav Ḥisda’s ruling. Why is someone who denies a deposit disqualified from testimony. He too may intend to search for the object and find it later. The objection demands consistency: if this explanation protects the guardian from theft suspicion for purposes of the oath, its force must also be examined for testimony. The Gemara must now define when denial establishes more than temporary delay.

16. 16·TerutzBava Metzia 5b

    כִּי אָמְרִינַן הַכּוֹפֵר בְּפִקָּדוֹן פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת, כְּגוֹן דְּאָתוּ סָהֲדֵי וְאַסְהִידוּ בֵּיהּ דְּהָהִיא שַׁעְתָּא אִיתֵיהּ לְפִקָּדוֹן בְּבֵיתֵיהּ וַהֲוָה יָדַע, אִי נָמֵי דַּהֲוָה נָקֵיט לֵיהּ בִּידֵיהּ.

    The Gemara limits disqualification to a case where witnesses exclude the evasion explanation. They testify that at the time of denial the deposit was in his house and he knew it, or that he was holding it in his hand. Its mere presence in the house is insufficient if he might not have known where it was. Knowledge and availability show that he did not need extra time to search and return it. The sources now align: potentially temporary denial differs from a denial that demonstrably withholds a known, available deposit.

17. 17·KushyaBava Metzia 5b

    אֶלָּא הָא דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא, מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתוֹ שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ, נֵימָא מִיגּוֹ דַּחֲשִׁיד אַמָּמוֹנָא חֲשִׁיד אַשְּׁבוּעָתָא!

    The Gemara turns to another ruling of Rav Huna: the guardian must swear that the deposit is not in his possession. This concerns a guardian who pays, yet may prefer to retain the object in exchange for its value. The ruling connects to later Bava Metzia discussions of guardians’ payment and the concern that a guardian has coveted the deposit. Here the suspicion appears to involve keeping the object rather than merely searching for it before returning it. The question therefore returns: if he is suspect regarding property, why rely on his oath.

18. 18·TerutzBava Metzia 5b

    הָתָם נָמֵי, מוֹרֶה וְאָמַר: דְּמֵי קָא יָהֵבְנָא לֵיהּ.

    The Gemara answers that the guardian may justify his conduct because he pays compensation. In his own eyes, payment makes retaining the object different from ordinary theft. This does not establish permission to take the object without the owner’s consent. It distinguishes the objective prohibition from the person’s rationalization. His conduct therefore does not establish that he would also swear falsely, which the same rationale does not excuse.

19. 19·KushyaBava Metzia 5b

    אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּיפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: וְהָא קָא עָבַר עַל לָאו דְּ״לֹא תַּחְמֹד״?

    Rav Aḥa of Difti objects to Ravina that the guardian violates the prohibition against coveting. Payment does not remove the problem of taking the object against its owner’s will. The objection assumes that if the guardian recognizes the prohibition and violates it anyway, self-justification does not adequately explain why he would avoid false swearing. It therefore probes the precise content of the proposed rationalization. Saying that he pays is insufficient unless payment explains how he views his conduct.

20. 20·TerutzBava Metzia 5b

    ״לֹא תַּחְמֹד״ לְאִינָשֵׁי בְּלָא דְּמֵי מַשְׁמַע לְהוּ.

    The answer is that people mistakenly understand the prohibition against coveting as applying only to taking without payment. The guardian may therefore think that compensation places his conduct outside the prohibition. The Gemara explains his perception rather than changing the legal meaning of the prohibition. This answers the objection because he is not necessarily making a conscious decision to violate a prohibition he recognizes. The page thus ends by distinguishing forbidden conduct, the actor’s justification, and willingness to swear falsely.

1. 1Why is a shepherd of other people’s animals not disqualified merely because of his occupation? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
2. 2What does the framework all of it is mine, but on your terms accomplish in the garment oath? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
3. 3Why is partial admission not decisive proof that someone suspected of monetary wrongdoing can swear? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
4. 4What rules out temporary evasion for someone denying a deposit? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
5. 5What does the answer that people understand coveting as taking without payment teach? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.