Daf 3b: An Oath Triggered by Witnesses and the Kal VaChomer

Here is the complete Gemara text of this daf, word for word, divided into the stages of the sugya: Mishnah, question, kushya, terutz, raya and conclusion. Read each stage in the source first, then the explanation.

1. 01·TerutzBava Metzia 3b

   וְהַאי בְּכוּלֵּיהּ בָּעֵי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ. וְהַאי דְּלָא אוֹדִי – אִשְׁתְּמוֹטֵי הוּא דְּקָא מִישְׁתְּמֵט מִינֵּיהּ, סָבַר: עַד דְּהָווּ לִי זוּזִי וּפָרַעְנָא לֵיהּ, וְאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: רְמִי שְׁבוּעָה עֲלֵיהּ כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ, אֲבָל הַעֲדָאַת עֵדִים, דְּלֵיכָּא לְמֵימַר הָכִי – אֵימָא לָא. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן קַל וָחוֹמֶר.

   The page continues the explanation of the partial admitter’s oath: he wants to admit everything but postpones part of the payment until he has money. This does not declare every such defendant truthful; it explains how denial can be temporary evasion rather than an attempt to steal permanently. An oath can therefore prompt admission without assuming that someone who denies money will necessarily swear falsely. When a defendant denies everything and witnesses establish part of the debt, that same foundation of voluntary admission is absent. We might therefore exempt him from an oath, so Rabbi Chiyya needs a kal vachomer to require one. This supplies the background to his teaching on the previous page, presented alongside the Mishnah of two people holding a garment: this oath needs its own argumentative structure.

2. 02·The Gemara asksBava Metzia 3b

   וּמַאי קַל וָחוֹמֶר? וּמָה פִּיו שֶׁאֵין מְחַיְּיבוֹ מָמוֹן – מְחַיְּיבוֹ שְׁבוּעָה, עֵדִים שֶׁמְּחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ מָמוֹן – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמְּחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ שְׁבוּעָה?

   The Gemara asks what the kal vachomer is and presents its first formulation. The defendant’s own statement is described as unable to impose monetary liability, yet his partial admission requires an oath on the remainder. Two witnesses impose monetary liability, so their power should seemingly include requiring an oath concerning the rest of the claim. The assumption is that greater power to impose payment also indicates power to require an oath. We must now test both the accuracy of the comparison and the connection between these two powers.

3. 03·KushyaBava Metzia 3b

   וּפִיו אֵין מְחַיְּיבוֹ מָמוֹן?! וְהָא הוֹדָאַת בַּעַל דִּין כְּמֵאָה עֵדִים דָּמֵי!

   The Gemara challenges the premise: how can one say that a person’s own statement does not impose monetary liability? A litigant’s admission is like a hundred witnesses, so admitting a debt certainly requires payment. The phrase “like a hundred witnesses” emphasizes the admission’s binding force against its maker, not an actual count of witnesses. For an ordinary debt, witnesses therefore lack the advantage attributed to them by this formulation. The objection does not undermine the partial admitter’s oath; it demands a corrected basis for comparison.

4. 04·TerutzBava Metzia 3b

   מַאי ״מָמוֹן״ – קְנָס. וּמָה פִּיו שֶׁאֵין מְחַיְּיבוֹ קְנָס, מְחַיְּיבוֹ שְׁבוּעָה! עֵדִים שֶׁמְּחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ קְנָס, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמְּחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ שְׁבוּעָה!

   The Gemara corrects the term “money”: here it means a penalty, not an ordinary debt. A person’s admission does not impose a penalty on him, whereas testimony can do so. Despite that limitation, admission to part of an ordinary debt requires an oath concerning the remainder. The kal vachomer is therefore proposed again: witnesses, whose power extends further in penalties, should also require an oath. This is not an oath about a penalty itself; penalty law supplies the comparison between admission and testimony.

5. 05·KushyaBava Metzia 3b

   מָה לְפִיו – שֶׁכֵּן מְחַיְּיבוֹ קׇרְבָּן, תֹּאמַר בְּעֵדִים שֶׁאֵין מְחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ קׇרְבָּן!

   The Gemara identifies an advantage in the opposite direction: a person’s statement can obligate him to bring an offering, whereas witnesses cannot do so in the case under discussion. The case will shortly be specified as witnesses saying that he ate forbidden fat while he denies it. If admission has a distinctive power concerning offerings, it cannot simply be ranked as the weaker source. That distinctive power might also matter for its ability to require an oath. This challenges the kal vachomer: one need not prove its conclusion false, only show that the ranking of the sources is not one-directional.

6. 06·TerutzBava Metzia 3b

   הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא: רַבִּי חִיָּיא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר: עֵדִים מְחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ קׇרְבָּן מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר.

   The Gemara answers that Rabbi Chiyya follows Rabbi Meir regarding an offering imposed through witnesses. Rabbi Meir uses a kal vachomer to establish that witnesses can require an offering even when the person denies the act. On that view, the supposed advantage of admission is not exclusive to admission. The offering objection therefore does not defeat Rabbi Chiyya’s kal vachomer. This answer depends on a particular position; it does not claim agreement among all the tannaim.

7. 07·Mishnah / BaraitaBava Metzia 3b

   דִּתְנַן: אָמְרוּ לוֹ שְׁנַיִם ״אָכַלְתָּ חֵלֶב״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״, רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִים.

   A Mishnah is quoted to establish the dispute supporting the answer. Two witnesses tell a person that he ate chelev, forbidden fat, and he says that he did not eat it. Rabbi Meir requires a sin offering, while the Sages exempt him. The issue is an offering for inadvertent consumption, not a liability arising from every instance of eating forbidden fat without distinction. The Mishnah supplies the source for Rabbi Meir’s position, while the next move explains the reasoning on both sides.

8. 08·KushyaBava Metzia 3b

   אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: אִם הֱבִיאוּהוּ שְׁנַיִם לִידֵי מִיתָה חֲמוּרָה, לֹא יְבִיאוּהוּ לִידֵי קׇרְבָּן הַקַּל? אָמְרוּ לוֹ: מָה אִם יִרְצֶה לוֹמַר ״מֵזִיד הָיִיתִי״ – יִפָּטֵר.

   Rabbi Meir reasons that witnesses can bring a person to execution when the necessary conditions are met, so they should certainly be able to require the lighter consequence of an offering. The Sages respond that the person could say he acted intentionally and would then be exempt from a sin offering. Such a statement would not deny the act of eating established by the witnesses. Their power to establish an act therefore does not guarantee power to establish the inadvertence required for the offering. Exemption from the offering does not mean innocence of wrongdoing; the Sages expose a difference in the conditions of liability, not merely in severity. For our discussion, Rabbi Meir’s position is enough to explain how Rabbi Chiyya can reject the preceding objection.

9. 09·TerutzBava Metzia 3b

   אֶלָּא: מָה לְפִיו – שֶׁכֵּן מְחַיְּיבוֹ אָשָׁם! אָשָׁם הַיְינוּ קׇרְבָּן.

   A new objection is proposed: a person’s statement obligates him to bring a guilt offering, so perhaps admission still has an advantage over witnesses. In the monetary setting, this concerns the guilt offering associated with denying a monetary obligation under oath and subsequently admitting it. The Gemara immediately answers that a guilt offering is an offering, so changing the type of offering does not create a new distinction here. Within the answer already given through Rabbi Meir’s position, the offering objection has been addressed. A renewed challenge needs an advantage that does not simply repeat the previous foundation.

10. 10·TerutzBava Metzia 3b

    אֶלָּא: מָה לְפִיו – שֶׁכֵּן מְחַיְּיבוֹ חוֹמֶשׁ. הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, רַבִּי חִיָּיא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, כִּי הֵיכִי דִּמְחַיֵּיב לֵיהּ קׇרְבָּן מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר – מְחַיֵּיב לֵיהּ חוֹמֶשׁ מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר.

    The Gemara now proposes a distinctive monetary advantage: a person’s admission obligates him in an additional fifth in the relevant case of denial under oath followed by admission. Seemingly, even if witnesses can require an offering, that does not yet establish their power to impose this additional payment. The answer attributes Rabbi Meir’s approach to Rabbi Chiyya here as well. Just as witnesses require an offering through a kal vachomer within this framework, they also require the additional fifth through a kal vachomer. The fifth therefore does not remain an exclusive advantage of admission under the assumptions supporting the argument.

11. 11·KushyaBava Metzia 3b

    אֶלָּא: מָה לְפִיו – שֶׁכֵּן אֵינוֹ בְּהַכְחָשָׁה וּבַהֲזָמָה, תֹּאמַר בְּעֵדִים שֶׁיֶּשְׁנָן בְּהַכְחָשָׁה וּבַהֲזָמָה.

    The Gemara shifts from the range of liabilities to the stability of the source imposing them. A litigant’s admission is not subject to contradiction and hazamah in the way testimony is. Contradiction supplies conflicting testimony about the event, while hazamah establishes that the witnesses were elsewhere at the relevant time. This does not mean that every admission is immune to all examination; these mechanisms for challenging testimony do not operate on admission in the same way. Admission thus has a structural advantage that might explain its power to require an oath. No answer to this objection is given here, and the Gemara will move to another foundation.

12. 12·TerutzBava Metzia 3b

    אֶלָּא אָתְיָא מֵעֵד אֶחָד: וּמָה עֵד אֶחָד שֶׁאֵין מְחַיְּיבוֹ מָמוֹן, מְחַיְּיבוֹ שְׁבוּעָה – עֵדִים שֶׁמְּחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ מָמוֹן, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמְּחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ שְׁבוּעָה!

    Instead of deriving the rule from a litigant’s admission, the Gemara proposes deriving it from one witness. A single witness does not impose payment through his testimony alone, but he does require the defendant to swear against his testimony. Two witnesses impose payment, so they should seemingly also require an oath concerning the remainder. This new source avoids admission’s distinctive advantage concerning contradiction and hazamah, because testimony is now being compared with testimony. We must still ask whether the single-witness oath serves the same function as the oath in Rabbi Chiyya’s teaching.

13. 13·KushyaBava Metzia 3b

    מָה לְעֵד אֶחָד שֶׁכֵּן עַל מָה שֶׁהוּא מֵעִיד הוּא נִשְׁבָּע,

    The Gemara objects that, with one witness, the defendant swears about the very matter to which the witness testifies. If the witness testifies to a particular debt, the oath directly addresses that testimony. In Rabbi Chiyya’s case, by contrast, the portion established by two witnesses must be paid, and the oath concerns the portion not established. A single witness’s power to require an oath within the scope of his testimony therefore does not prove that witnesses can require an oath beyond their testimony. The page ends with this objection; we should conclude neither that the single-witness argument is complete nor that Rabbi Chiyya’s ruling has been rejected.

1. 1What is the role of the explanation that the defendant is temporarily evading payment? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
2. 2How is the statement that his own words do not impose monetary liability corrected? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
3. 3Why does the Sages’ response, “I acted intentionally,” matter for the offering? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
4. 4Which objection prompts the move from admission to a single witness? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
5. 5What distinction does the objection at the end of the page identify? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.